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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Merger & Acquisition Activity in Switzerland
Mergers and acquisitions in Switzerland have been steadily
growing over the years. This activity peaked in 1988, when a total
of 274 deals and 37 joint venture agreements were publicly
announced.' A 1989 survey listed more than 400 mergers and
acquisitions.2 Many of Switzerland's corporations are either
privately held or controlled by one shareholder or one family. All
of the acquisitions listed in the survey were made either by private
agreement, by merger, or by a tender offer which was subsequently
supported by the management of the offeree company.3 However,
several unsolicited bids, or attempts to take over a company, have
occurred over the past few years, involving such well known
companies as Hero,4 Usego,5 George Fischer, Hoffman-LaRoche,
1. N. Vogt & R. Watter, Switzerland in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN EUROPE 13/8 (1990)
[hereinafter Vogt & Watter].
2. Tschaeni, 2 TAx Nom's INT'L 991 (199). See id stating:
. . . which represents an increase of approximately 50 percent
compared to the preceding year. Of the total mergers and acquisitions,
out-bound activities (namely Swiss companies acquiring non-Swiss
companies) have increased from under 20 percent 10 years ago to 37
percent in 1989. Here, a trend can be seen to acquire European
companies. In-bound transactions (namely non-Swiss companies
acquiring Swiss companies) have decreased from approximately 19
percent 10 years ago to 10 percent in 1989, while domestic mergers
and acquisitions accounted for 53 percent of the total M & A activity
in 1989 compared to 70 percent 10 years ago. Statistics show that
mergers and acquisitions have taken place in practically all business
segments. Comparatively speaking, management buy-outs (MBOs)
have drastically increased, with the referenced survey showing 15
MBOs in 1989.
It is expected that M & A activities will continue at the same
pace in 1990. The primary reason for this high level of activity is the
creation of the 1992 common market.
Id
3. See N. VoGT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 209 (J. Lufkin &
D. Gallagher eds. 1990). See also Tschaeni, 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 990-92 (1990).
4. See Peters, Protection Against Hostile Takeovers and the Exercise of Shareholder Voting
Rights in Switzerland, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 545 n.132, 546 n.133-37 (1990).
5. See Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 210.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
La Suisse,6 Rinsox & Ormond, Gewerbebank Baden, Publicitas,
and (most recently) Mikron.7 None of these attempts were
successful, and many were frustrated by a white knight acquiring
the offeree and/or the shares held by the raider, often at a
considerable premium.' Although the number of management buy-
outs remains rather low, the buy-outs of such firms as Juvena and
Kardex have attracted considerable attention.9
B. Switzerland's Securities Markets0
At the end of 1989, 193 Swiss corporations were listed on the
three major Swiss stock exchanges in Zurich, Geneva, and Basel.
Many of these corporations have their bearer and registered shares
listed. Some companies have even issued and listed "participation
certificates," a type of non-voting stock." Pre-exchange trading
also exists on the major exchanges. Pre-exchange trading involves
securities of medium and smaller sized companies which do not
comply with the reporting requirements of the stock exchange or
which are not listed.
Besides the three major Swiss stock exchanges, there are
additional stock exchanges in Lausanne, Berne, St. Gall, and
Neuchatel. Over-the-counter markets have also been organized by
a number of specialized banks.
The Cantons are empowered to enact laws regarding the trading
of securities. Although the Swiss stock exchanges are all self-
regulating, the degree of self-regulation varies. In contrast, the
listing requirements are uniformly applied to each of the three
major stock exchanges. A Swiss company that wants its securities
listed must: (i) generally have been in business for at least five
6. See id.
7. See id at 219.
8. See Peters, supra note 4, at 548.
9. See Tschaeni, 2 TAx NOTrs INT'L 994 (1990).
10. See Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/11; N. VooT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE GOVMNANCE 209 (J. Lufkin & D. Gallagher eds. 1990); THE HELvETIA FUND, INC.,
1987 PROSPECTuS 25-29. The author of this article is Swiss legal advisor to the Helvetia Fund.
11. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing Placing Voting Shares with
"Friendly" Parties).
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years; (ii) have published its audited balance sheet, profit and loss
statements, and its business report; or (iii) be capitalized in an
amount of not less than SFr. five million. A further listing
requirement is that securities have previously achieved a
sufficiently wide market. Generally, when new securities are listed
a member of the stock exchange will act as a sponsor for the new
applicant.
Disclosure requirements at the time of the listing of a new class
of shares are limited compared to other jurisdictions. There is also
no stringent requirement for continuing disclosure of a listed
company.
The majority of trading in domestic securities on Swiss stock
exchanges is through cash transactions. These transactions are
generally completed within three days. The speed at which these
transactions are completed is partially attributable to the heightened
use of the telequote system, a system which transmits trading
information directly to banks and brokers.
One special feature of the Swiss securities market is off-the-
floor trading. Switzerland has no regulations restricting such
trading, which may include listed securities. Therefore, anyone
licensed to deal professionally in securities may freely do so. For
example, there are more than 170 registered broker/dealers in
Zurich not represented on the floor of the exchange who may
participate in off-the-floor trading. Further, banks, which are
permitted to act as broker/dealers in Switzerland, often use off-the-
floor trading as a means of off-setting customers' purchase and sale
orders against each other at the current exchange price. Partially
due to its accessibility, many believe that off-the-floor trading is at
least as important as the reported trading on the various Swiss
stock exchanges.
An additional means of trading is the Swiss Options and
Financial Futures Exchange (SOFFEX). SOFFEX is a fully
computerized exchange for trading in standardized options on
bearer shares of a number of Swiss companies. Bearer shares often
trade at a premium over registered shares because they are freely
transferable and because registered shares, which are often reserved
for Swiss investors, trade in a smaller market.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
C. Capital Market12
In 1988, the Swiss capital market raised a total of SFr. fifty-six
billion. Foreign issuers accounted for 74% of this sum. This
amount is expected to decline, however, in 1989 because of the
increase in interest rates during the first half of the year (for
example, the average rate of treasury bonds in 1988 was 4.11%,
and in August 1989 it rose to 5.15%).
In 1987, the Swiss equity market ranked seventh worldwide in
terms of market capitalization. 3 The stock market index rose in
1988 by 22.4%, and by a further 27% in the first half of 1989,
approximately reaching its pre-crash level.
D. Rules Regarding Acquisitions
1. In General
The rules governing the acquisition of Swiss companies and
their organizations generally may be found in the Swiss Code of
Obligations. The following articles contain these rules:
- Articles 620-762, Swiss Code of Obligations regarding
the organization of corporations ("Akitengesellschaft" or
"Socit6" anonyme);
- Articles 748-751, Swiss Code of Obligations regarding
the merger of corporations;
- Articles 184-215, Swiss Code of Obligations regarding
the purchase of movables. These rules apply by analogy
to the purchase of shares;
- Article 181, Swiss Code of Obligations regarding the
transfer of business enterprises.
The Swiss Code of Obligations also contains rules relating to
the execution of contracts, the rescission of contracts based on
material error or fraud, the employer/employee relationship, the
12. See Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/5.
13. THE HELVETIA FUND, INc., 1987 PROSPECTUS 25.
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transfer of claims and liabilities and provisions regarding
promissory notes. Rules relating to movable property, real property
and the pledging of property including shares may be found in the
Swiss Civil Code.
The federal legislature has enacted other regulations pertaining
to the banking sector, competition rules, and rules regarding the
acquisition of real property by foreign residents. Also, there are
Cantonal rules which cover the securities markets and stock
exchanges as well as court organization. Federal and Cantonal tax
laws will often be decisive for the structuring of a transaction.
2. Swiss Company Law
Swiss Company Law contains rules concerning the
transferability of shares, and delineates the corporate action
required to transfer the shares of a business. 4
Under the Swiss Company law, approval by the shareholders of
the acquiring corporation (the "acquirer") is required when:
(i) the business of the offeree company is beyond the
statutory purpose of acquirer. In this instance, the
shareholders must approve a change of the articles of
association of the acquirer. This change must be
approved by a two thirds majority of- all outstanding
votes (Article 648, Swiss Code of Obligations);
(ii) the consideration is given in shares. In this case, the
shareholders must approve an increase in the share
capital in order to issue the shares.
The shareholders of the offeree will also have to approve the
transaction either by selling their shares or, in the case of a merger
or a sale of all of the assets followed by a liquidation of the
company, by a vote in the shareholders' meeting.
15
14. Articles 620-762, Swiss Code of Obligations.
15. See Article 649, Swiss Code of Obligations (requiring a special quorum). Article 649 of the
Swiss Code of Obligations provides:
Save as otherwise provided in the statutes, resolutions whereby the
company extends the scope of its operations by including therein a
related business, remaining however within the limits of the corporate
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Special disclosure requirements apply if the transaction is
financed by an increase in the share capital. These disclosure
requirements apply irrespective of whether the newly issued shares
will be used as consideration to the seller, or whether existing
shareholders or the public subscribe to these shares for cash, which
in turn is used to pay the purchase price.16 If the shares are
offered to the public, prospectus requirements may also apply. 7
3. Rules Regulating Private Acquisitions
Articles 184-215 of the Swiss Code of Obligations govern the
acquisition of shares, including controlling blocks of shares. These
articles concern the sale of movable goods. These rules, however,
are very general in nature and commercial parties may derogate
from almost all of them by tacit, oral, or written agreement. The
most important rules are found in Articles 190 and 214, regarding
the default of either party, and in Article 192 and subsequent
articles, pertaining to breaches of representations and warranties.
E. Information Available on Swiss Companies
Basic information about the articles of assQciation of a
corporation, share capital, the numbers and types of shares, and the
names of directors, managers and officers are available at the
object, or contracts the scope of its operations, may only be adopted
at a general meeting at which at least two thirds of all the shares are
represented; the same shall apply to resolutions relating to a merger
and those which extend the duration of the company beyond the
period provided for in the statutes or which change the name of the
company or transfer its registered office or give rise to its dissolution
before the expiry date laid down in the statutes.
Where a first general meeting is not attended by persons representing two
thirds of all the shares, a second general meeting may be convened at which the
resolutions referred to in the first paragraph of this article may be adopted
provided that one third of the shares are represented.
Save as otherwise provided in the statutes, the second general meeting
may not be held until at least eight days after the first.
16. Article 650, 1 [2]; arts. 628, 630, 636, Swiss Code of Obligations.
17. Article 651, Swiss Code of Obligations.
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Commercial Register.18 The office on debt collections keep
records which may give further indications as to the financial
strength of the Offeree Company and its ability to meet payment
dates.
18. The relevant provisions of the Swiss Code of Obligations provide:
Article 640
The company shall be entered in the Register of Commerce of the place where
its registered office is situated.
The application for registration shall be signed by the directors in the presence
of the Registrar or shall be sent to him in writing, bearing their duly attested
signatures.
The following shall be annexed to the application for registration:
1. a certified copy of the statutes;
2. the notarial act recording the proceedings of the meeting of the
subscribers or, in the case of incorporation in one act, the incorporative
act;
3. the draft statutes and also, if appropriate, the prospectus and the
founder's report;
4. the document recording the appointment of the administration and
auditors, giving the address and nationality of the directors.
The names of the persons authorized to represent (i.e. to bind the company
legally by their signature e.g. procuration holders) the company shall be notified
to the Registrar. Where they are appointed by the beard of directors, the original
or a certified copy of the minutes of the meeting of the boards shall be
produced.
Article 641
The following shall be entered in the Register of Commerce:
1. the date of the statutes;
2. the name and registered office of the company;
3. the objects and purpose of the undertaking and also the duration of the
company if the statutes contain provisions relating thereto;
4. the amount of the capital, the amounts paid up and the par value of the
shares;
5. whether the shares are registered or to bearer and, where applicable, the
privileges attaching to certain classes of shares;
6. the subject-matter and price of the contributions in kind and assets
acquired, and the extent and value of the advantages accorded to
founders or other persons;
7. the manner (e.g. the formalities required - single or joint signature) in
which the company is to be represented;
8. the names, addresses and nationality of the directors and persons
authorized to represent the company;
9. the form of the notices to be published by the company and of the
communications to be addressed by the directors to the shareholders, if
the statutes require a special form.
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Except for listed companies and companies with listed bond
issues, Swiss law does not require companies to publish their
balance sheets. However, under the Swiss Code of Obligations,
shareholders and creditors are entitled to receive a balance sheet
and a profit and loss statement. 9
It should be noted, however, that Swiss balance sheets often do
not reflect the true value of the company because the board of
directors may create "hidden reserves" by undervaluing assets or
by overvaluing liabilities. These hidden reserves have the net effect
of reducing the reported earnings of a company. Because a
company may attribute part of the reported earnings to "open
reserves," the pay-out ratio of Swiss corporations, compared to
their real earnings, is relatively small. These low dividends have,
in turn, led to a general undervaluation of Swiss stock.
F. The Role of Advisers and Financial Institutions
Major Swiss banks and a number of specialized companies offer
various services in the merger and acquisition field. These services
include searching for possible offeree companies, and arranging
the financing of a transaction.
Drafting necessary documents usually is performed by
specialized law firms. These law firms may also provide advice on
the relevant tax issues involved. Because tax considerations greatly
influence the structuring of transactions, as well as the drafting of
certain clauses in an acquisition agreement, it may be helpful either
to foster a close relationship between tax advisers and legal
counsel, or to retain specialized lawyers acquainted with pertinent
tax issues to draft or review the documents.
G. New Trends, Outlook
Generally, there is a clear trend towards importing Anglo-
American merger and acquisition practices into Switzerland. This
is evident in the hostile take-over area, where Eng!ish terms such
19. Articles 696/7 and 704, Swiss Code of Obligations.
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as "raider," "white-knight," "poison pill" and "golden
parachute" have become common expressions. The Anglo-
American influence is also apparent in the drafting of private
acquisition agreements, which have been progressively
incorporating more American-styled clauses.
Further changes in the merger and acquisition field in
Switzerland are expected. Currently, there is a proposed revision of
the Swiss Company Law,2" a potential for future regulation of the
Swiss security markets, and new rules, entitled the Swiss Take
Over Code, are expected to be issued by the Association of Swiss
Stock Exchanges.21 Each of these changes are expected to have
significant legal ramifications on mergers and acquisitions.
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. No Regulations with Respect to Tender Offers
There are presently no rules in Switzerland with regard to tender
offers affecting either the acquirer or the offeree company.
However, the Association of the Swiss Stock Exchanges has
recently issued a take over code which may have'some regulating
force over tender offers. Compared to regulations in other
countries, this takeover code has a relatively limited scope.22
B. No Disclosure Rules for Acquirer
There are presently no rules requiring an acquirer of shares to
disclose its present share holdings and its intention to purchase
shares exceeding a certain percentage level.
20. See Peters, supra note 4, at 550-57.
21. See infra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Swiss Take-Over Code).
22. See id.
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C. No Exchange Control'
There are, as a general rule, no restrictions on capital
transactions between Switzerland and other countries. The Swiss
National Bank may, however, regulate the country's money supply
and implement credit and currency policies. Foreign based entities
that want to raise capital in the Swiss market (respectively their
Swiss underwriters) must first obtain approval by the Swiss
National Bank. Approvals are generally granted.
Under certain circumstances, the Swiss Government may
prohibit the sale of securities issued by Swiss companies. For
example, in 1978, the Swiss Government prohibited the sale of
Swiss securities in an effort to maintain the exchange rate of the
Swiss franc.24 No such rules are presently in force.
D. No Restrictions on Foreign Investment 5
Foreigners may acquire all types of domestic assets and shares
in domestic companies without obtaining special approval, with the
exception of (i) companies engaging in certain regulated businesses,
such as banks; and (ii) real property or companies that hold real
property. 6 Despite the paucity of restrictions, many Swiss
corporations limit the transfer of their registered shares to
foreigners.27
A change of control of a business which needs a license or a
concession to operate may require approval by competent
authorities. Businesses requiring a license include those dealing
with transportation, health, and importing agricultural goods. In
contrast to purchasing a business, merely purchasing shares of a
23. See Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/14; N. VoGT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL
CoRRATE GovEuANcE 215-16 (J. Lufldn & D. Gallagher eds. 1990); THE HELVLrnA FUND, INC.,
1987 PROSPECTUS 24.
24. Article 16i, 1 [1], § 3 of the Federal Law on the National Bank.
25. Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/14; THE HELVEIA FUND, INC., 1987 PROSPECTUS 24.
26. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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corporation which has been granted a license or a concession will
not require such approval.
E. Rules Regarding the Acquisition of Real Property by
Foreigners8
The Federal Law on the Acquisition of Real Property by
Foreigners of December 16, 1983, (usually referred to as Lex
Friedrich)29 not only limits the acquisition of real property, but
also limits the purchase of shares of a company which owns real
property,30 or the merger with such a company. The Lex Friedrich
applies to a purchase of shares of a company that owns real
property only if (i) the acquirer is a non-resident foreigner, a
foreign corporation or a Swiss corporation which is controlled by
a non-resident foreigner, (ii) the acquirer holds a controlling
position. The acquirer is in a controlling position if, inter alia,
foreign ownership exceeds one-third of all shares, and (iii) the
market value of the real property is more than one third of the
market value of the total assets of the company
Unless the value is clearly below this threshold, the acquirer
must seek a decision from competent authorities that the Lex
Friedrich is not applicable to the purchase of the shares.31 In
practical terms, the seller will usually seek such a decision. This is
particularly true in uncertain cases, in which the purchaser will not
complete the purchase unless all authorizations have been obtained.
If the value of the real property exceeds one-third of the total
assets, the foreign purchaser must seek the approval by competent
28. See Kienast & Diethelm, Foreign Investment in Swiss Real Estate, 4 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 43
(1985); Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/14-15; Peters, supra note 4, at 543-44; Weber, Statutory
Restrictions to the Participation in Companies by Non-residents Holding Real Estate in Switzerland,
18 INT'L Bus. LAw. 458 (1990); N. VOrT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
209 (J. Lufldn & D. Gallagher eds. 1990).
29. For an English translation, with an introduction by Dr. R. Friedrich, the Minister of Justice
after whom the law was named, see S. WYLER & B. WYLER, LEX FRIEDRICH LAW AND ORDINANCE
ON THE ACQUISITION IN SWH-ZERLAND OF LANDED PROPERTY BY PERSONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(1989).
30. As defined in Article 4 Lex Freidrich and Article 1 of the implementing ordinance.
31. See Article 17 Lex Friedrich.
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authorities. Authorization is generally granted if the real property
is necessary for the corporation to conduct its business (for
example, for manufacturing, office space). Oftentimes,
authorization will only be granted under certain conditions such as
a prohibition of resale or a requirement that the shares be deposited
with the competent Cantonal authorities or agencies.32 No
authorization will be granted if the real property is near a military
installation or if the acquisition is considered contrary to the public
interest.
A purchase of shares in a company holding real estate without
obtaining the necessary approvals by the competent authorities is
considered void under the Lex Friedrich.
F. Rules on the Employment of Foreign Nationals
33
Switzerland imposes very strict limitations on working permits
granted to foreign employees. Each Canton has, according to the
size of its economy, a yearly quota of working permits it may
grant. Therefore, if a foreign group purchases a Swiss corporation,
the acquirer can not expect to staff the corporation entirely with
management from its home country. Working permits for top
executives, skilled technicians and specialists essential to the
establishment and smooth operation of a business will usually be
granted subject to the availability of such permits in that Canton.
III. COMPETTION RuLES
34
By comparison to the United States and the European
Community, Switzerland has relatively limited rules regarding
competition. Article 30 of the Federal Law on Cartels of December
20, 1985, provides that the Federal Commission on Cartels may
investigate mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures if the
32. See Article 14 Lex Friedrich and Article 11 of the implementing ordinance.
33. See Vogt & Walter, supra note 1, at 13/15.
34. See Vogt, Protecting Your Own, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 25 (1988); Vogt & Walter, supra
note 1, at 13/15-16.
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transactions lead to or enforce a dominant position in a market
which could have either economically or socially detrimental
consequences. There is, however, no duty imposed on the parties
to seek authorization from the Commission prior to completing a
transaction. Furthermore, the Commission has no power to order a
divestiture even if it concludes that a merger will have detrimental
consequences. The Commission's power is limited to issuing orders
that regulate the market behavior of the new entity or the new
group.35 The Commission's orders must further be confirmed by
the Federal Department of Economy if they are contested.
If the new entity or group has a market position that allows it
to substantially influence the pricing of goods or services, price
increases may fall under the control of the Federal Supervisor of
Prices. This department may, under certain circumstances, prohibit
such price increases.
The Federal Law on Unfair Competition may apply to certain
practices in a contested take-over situation, especially if the raider
is a competitor of the offeree and has attempted to influence the
business decisions of the offeree's management.
IV. PuBLic OFFERS IN GENERAL
A. Preliminary Remarks
As previously mentioned, there are presently no direct rules or
regulations regarding public offers in Switzerland. However, some
rules may be inferred from the directors' duty of care and duty of
loyalty towards the company and its shareholders. This applies to
friendly offers which the director may only accept if the offers are
in the best interest of the shareholders, as well as to unfriendly
take-overs where the director's duty will require the director to
exclude certain defensive tactics.
Prospectus requirements exist in circumstances in which the
acquirer offers shares or bonds in exchange for the shares of the
35. Article 32 of the Federal Law of Cartels.
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offeree.36 However, these rules rarely apply since most tender
offers are made against a cash payment.
So-called friendly offers are those supported by the management
of the offeree company. The mangement then recommends to their
shareholders whether to accept the offer of the acquirer.
Sometimes, the acquirer and the offeree company may enter into
an agreement regarding the future cooperation of the two entities.
The agreement may contain a pledge by the management of the
offeree company that it will recommend acceptance of the offer.
However, the board of directors of the offeree company must act
carefully and treat the shareholders equally by giving them a fair
opportunity to determine whether to accept the acquirer's offer.
There is no need for a shareholders' meeting to approve a
friendly offer. However, the shareholders are free not to tender
their shares. The opposite is true in a merger after the shareholders
have approved the offer--the shareholders must tender their shares.
Additionally, while a merger can only be made against shares, in
the case of a friendly takeover, the acquirer has a choice of the
type of consideration to be given.
Only a few unfriendly offers have been launched in
Switzerland.37 No court decisions presently exist which define the
extent of the duty of the board of directors to fight such a public
offer, or the possibilities by which the board of editors may contest
the offer nor whether such action is permitted. Since there are no
rules regulating the behavior of acquirer (for example, there are no
rules regarding the disclosure of a purchase of a certain percentage
of shares), there are also no laws or regulations that would require
the management of the offeree to issue a statement or to abstain
from certain defensive tactics. However, the general duty of the
management towards the company and the personal liability of the
members of the board of directors and of the management where
this duty has been breached does provide some means of assessing
36. Articles 651 and 1156, Swiss Code of Obligations.
37. See, e.g., in the case of Micron AG where, however, the opposition was successful. See also
N. VoaT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GovERNANcE 209 (J. Lufldn & D. Gallagher
eds. 1990).
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the potential reaction of the management of the offeree
company. 8
B. The Swiss Take-Over Code39
The Association of Swiss Stock Exchanges issued a Swiss Take-
Over Code on August 30, 1989. This code entered into force on
September 1, 1989. This Code is comparable to the U.K. City Code
in the manner that it regulates offers. However, the Swiss Take-
Over Code is much narrower in its proposed field of application
and in its attempt to restrict certain practices of acquirers and
offerees. In general, it may be said that the new Swiss Take-Over
Code favors the interests of the management of the offeree
companies.
The Swiss Take-Over Code may be viewed as an attempt by the
Association of the Swiss Stock Exchanges to avoid legislation
regulating take-overs. Such legislation is presently under
consideration. The Code provides, inter alia, for a take-over
commission that would monitor take-overs. The Code neither
includes the duty of the acquirer to disclose information to the
shareholders nor the duty of the offeree's management to issue
statements that would allow the shareholders to make a well
informed choice. Furthermore, it remains to be seen to what extent
professional advisers and outsiders will abide by the rules of the
Code since only members of the stock exchanges (namely banks)
are expressly bound by it.
The main purposes of the Code are to provide shareholders with
adequate information, to avoid market manipulation and generally
to define what is fair behavior of all parties involved. Shareholders
of the offeree should have the option to accept an offer even if the
offeree management rejects it.
38. Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13/66.
39. See Vogt, New Swiss Take-over Code, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 489 (1989); Vogt & Watter,
supra note 1, at 13/39-41; Peters, supra note 4, at 571-75.
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According to the Code, duties of the acquirer include:
(i) The acquirer must treat the offeree shareholders equally.
There is no specific rule, however, which would exclude
purchases outside of the offer.
(ii) The acquirer may not withdrawal the offer, unless a
competing offer is launched.
(iii) Partial offers are permitted but the acquirer must
accept the tendered shares on a pro rata basis. If the
offer was for 100%, the acquirer must grant an
additional period for shareholders to tender their
shares after the offer has become unconditional. The
code further provides for a mandatory offer for all
shares if acquirer purchases more than 50% of all
outstanding shares.
(iv) The offer must remain open during at least one
month, and not more than two months.
(v) A report prepared by an accounting firm confirming
that the acquirer has abided by the rules of the Code
must be filed with the Commission.
(vi) The acquirer may not manipulate the market, for
example, by selling shares into the market during the
offer.
(vii) The acquirer is also required to prepare a prospectus.
Once an offer has been made, the management of the offeree is
under a duty to call a shareholders' meeting if an acquirer holding
at least ten percent of the share capital (which is not necessarily
identical with ten percent of the voting shares) of the offeree
requests such a meeting. This shareholders meeting will be
required, regardless of whether the articles of association give the
board of directors full discretion to refuse or to record the acquirer
as a shareholder of the corporation.4"
It is doubtful whether the duties imposed on the management of
the offeree fulfill the purpose of allowing the shareholders to make
a considerate choice since shareholders will usually not be able to
assess the value of their shares under the existing management. The
40. See infra notes 47-49 (discussing Share Transfer Restrictions).
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necessity of a report on the offer will make it virtually impossible
to launch a surprise attack on an offeree. Considerable danger of
insider dealing during the preparation of such report also exists.
C. Duty of Management vis-d-vis an Offer
There are as yet no court decisions in Switzerland that define
the duties of management vis-d-vis an unsolicited tender offer. In
addition, there are few guidelines that clearly delineate the
conditions an offer must fulfill in order for management to accept
it. Furthermore, a substantial degree of uncertainty exists regarding
the extent to which the management of the offeree may claim that
a tender offer is detrimental to the interests of employees and
creditors of the company.41
Generally, shareholders should be treated equally. They should
have sufficient time to consider an offer, and in the case of a
partial offer, their shares should be accepted on a pro rata basis. In
addition, shareholders should be given information about the an
Acquirer's ability to pay the purchase price and the intentions
concerning the offeree. If an offer fulfills these criteria it may be
accepted by the management. However, even if the offer meets this
standard, the directors may reject it if they believe in good faith
that the offer is not in the best interest of the shareholders. Of
course, it would be considered a breach of duty by the board of
directors if the rejection of an offer were based only on their
personal interest in keeping their positions. Directors are personally
liable for any damages incurred by their shareholders that were
caused by a breach of their directorial duties.42
41. The board of directors of the insurance company, La Suisse, preferred an offer (after an
auction for their company) of Rentenanstalt of SFr. 12'000.- per share over an offer by a raider for
SFr. 14'000.- and refused to declare that the latter would be recorded in the shareholders' register.
Possible Lex Friedrich problems and uncertain financing of the raider as well as the interests of
clients and employees were set forth as grounds. While the first two reasons seem justifiable, it is
much less clear whether the interests of clients and employees would supersede the shareholders'
interest to receive an additional SFr. 2'000.- for every share they held. See N. VoGT & R. WATrER,
INTERNATIONAL CoRPORATE GOVERNANcE 210 (J. Lufkin & D. Gallagher eds. 1990); Peters, supra
note 4, at 550 n.155.
42. Vogt & Watter, supra note 1, at 13166.
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V. DEFENSiVE MEASURES AGAINST UNFRIENDLY OFFERS
4 3
A. Principle of Free Transferability of Shares
Transfer rights and restrictions placed on registered and/or
bearer shares in a Swiss stock company are exclusively regulated
by the provisions of the Swiss Code of Obligations regarding Swiss
company law.' There are no securities regulations comparable to
those in the United States or the United Kingdom. Thus, there are
no reporting or disclosure requirements with regard to the
acquisition of substantial shareholdings in a Swiss company. Only
the new Swiss Take-Over Code provides for certain rules regarding
public offers.45 Neither Cantonal (i.e. state) stock exchange
regulations, nor the Federal Cartels Law are be applicable. Further,
no public authority has any power to intervene, provided that the
company is not engaged in banking, insurance, or any other
regulated business. One exception to this general deficiency of
power is the Lex Friedrich, which regulates the acquisition of
Swiss real property by foreigners."
In principle, under the Swiss Code of Obligations, shares in
bearer or registered form are freely transferable. Title in bearer
shares passes by simple transfer of the security. In addition to the
transfer of ownership in the security, the transfer of registered
shares needs an endorsement by the seller and the registration by
the purchaser as the new shareholder in the company's shareholder
register.
43. See Arnold, Defensive Measures Against Takeovers in Switzerland, 8 INT'L Bus. LAW. 41
(1980).
44. Vogt & Wuestiner, Share Transfer Restrictions Under Swiss Law and Hostile Takeovers
of Swiss Companies, 16 INT'L Bus. LAw. 355 (1988).
45. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
46. The Lex Friedrich applies if more than one-third of the assets of a company are real
property and if the company will be controlled by foreigners. See supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text. In practice, the Lex Friedrich restrictions have prevented take-overs especially
in the hotel industry. See also Vogt & Wuestiner, Share Transfer Restrictions Under Swiss Law and
Hostile Takeovers of Swiss Companies, 16 INT'L Bus. LAw. 357 n.2 (1988).
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B. Share Transfer Restrictions
A company may restrict the free transfer of its shares in its by-
laws. Article 684, paragraph 1, of the Swiss Code of Obligations,
provides that a company may, in its by-laws, restrict the free
transfer of its registered shares.47 The board of directors of a
company may refuse to register a purchaser in the company's
register of shareholders (the "Vinkulierrung"). This refusal may be
based on specific grounds provided for in the by-laws.48 (for
example, i.e. foreign nationality, competitors, restriction of
individual shareholdings to a certain percentage). In addition,
Article 686, paragraph 2, of the Swiss Code of Obligations allows
a company to provide in its by-laws that the registration of, a
shareholder may be denied without any specific reason and without
disclosing the reason for refusal.
These provisions grant the board of directors arbitrary powers
to refuse any undesirable shareholder. Originally intended to protect
a company from control by foreigners in war time, and to enable
47. Article 684 of the Swiss Code of Obligations provides:
Registered Shares
Save as otherwise provided by the by-laws, registered shares shall be
transferable. Transfer may be effected by delivery of the certificate
endorsed in favor of the new holder.
48. Article 686 of the Swiss Code of Obligations provides:
Refusal to Register
The company shall be entitled to withhold registration on the grounds
provided for in the by-laws.
The by-laws may also provide that it shall be permitted to withhold
registration without disclosing the reason therefore. In the case of
shares which are not fully paid up the administration may require
security; if such security is not provided, registration may be withheld.
Where shares have been acquired by succession, by virtue of a
matrimonial regime or in execution proceedings, no securities may be
required and the entry in the share register may not be withheld unless
members of the administration or shareholders state that they are
willing to acquire such shares at the stock exchange quotation or, if
the shares are not quoted, at their real value at the time the application
for such registration was made.
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a company to prove its Swiss ownership,49 these anti-alienation
provisions have recently gained notoriety as mere anti-take-over
devices.
C. Gentleman's Agreement of the Swiss Banking Association with
Listed Swiss Companies in Support of Share Transfer
Restrictions
The transfer restrictions described above are also supported by
a Gentleman's Agreement of the Swiss Banking Association with
Swiss companies. Under this accord, the member banks" agreed
not to execute orders by an "unqualified buyer." In fulfilling this
agreement, Swiss companies agreed with the banks that specific
requirements (which are not disclosed to the public) must be met
by the purchaser of their shares in order to be accepted and
registered as a new shareholder. The Gentleman's Agreement has,
however, not proved to be an effective means of preventing sales
of registered shares to non-qualified purchasers, since the banks are
increasingly reluctant to enforce the rather extensive share transfer
restrictions of Swiss companies.
D. Bearer Shares, Registered Shares, and Combined/Voting Shares
The most important defensive device employed by Swiss
companies against a hostile take-over is the combined issuance of
registered shares and bearer shares. Under the Swiss Code of
Obligations, a Swiss company may issue its shares in registered
and/or bearer form. It is therefore possible for a Swiss company to
have both types of shares outstanding at the same time. Shares
must be issued at a par value of at least SFr. 100. However, the par
49. The transfer restrictions gained significance in the 1970s when Swiss companies became
internationally attractive for investors of OPEC countries and when the danger of foreign control
became a serious threat to major Swiss companies. In addition, it became more and more important
to prove Swiss control with the internationalization of services, when licenses to do business
(especially for banking and insurance) were only granted on mutuality.
50. Including most foreign controlled banks.
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value may differ for bearer and registered shares.5 Further, the
by-laws may provide that each share shall be entitled to one vote,
notwithstanding its nominal value. A Swiss company may therefore
create super-voting shares to the effect that a capital minority
becomes the voting majority. These, voting shares must be issued
in registered form.52
E. Placing Voting Shares with "Friendly" Parties
Creating the privileged registered shares described above53
requires the consent of two-thirds of the share capital. This quorum
usually makes it impossible to establish voting stock once a tender
offer is imminent. In addition, many companies have issued non-
voting participation certificates which entitle the holder only to
dividends, liquidation proceeds, and certain preemptive rights.54
The issuance of voting shares in registered form combined with
transfer restriction provisions (Vinkulierung) in the by-laws with
regard to registered shares enables the management to select and
control its shareholders and thereby reduce the danger of a hostile
take-over. Today, most Swiss companies traded on a Swiss stock-
exchange are structured in this fashion, and registered shareholders
often hold a large majority of the votes. While no major Swiss
company has limited its outstanding shares to bearer shares (with
51. Article 693, [1], Swiss Code of Obligations.
52. Article 693, 1 [2], Swiss Code of Obligations.
53. Article 693, [2], Swiss Code of Obligations.
54. In Switzerland, the use of participation certificates developed in the early 1960s principally
as a means of enabling Swiss companies not only to split their equity into more manageable portions,
but also to steer the company between an increased demand for investment capital and the apparent
danger of possible foreign control of the company. Certificates may be issued without a nominal
value or with a nominal value of less than SFr. 100.-. Participation Certificates furthermore fulfill
the function of non-voting shares (which as such are unknown to Swiss company law) and therefore
permit an increase of the company's "equity" without affecting the balance of control in the
company issuing such securities. See H. FREtMULLER, N. VooT, J. MARTY-LAVAUZELLE, HYBRID
CORPORATE SECuRiTiEs: INTERNATiONAL LEGAL AsPEcTs 30 (R. McCormick & H. Creamer eds.
1987).
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the exception of Hoffman-La Roche)," some companies have
issued shares in registered form only.56
An alternative strategy undertaken by Swiss companies has been
to increase the share capital and place the shares thereby issued
with friendly shareholders. This tactic requires that present
shareholders waive their option to the newly issued shares57
through a majority vote in the shareholders' meeting. Courts will
uphold such a decision if it is considered necessary to pursue the
objects and interests of the offeree.
F. Shareholder Agreement
Other defensive devices to prevent hostile take-overs include
shareholder agreements between individual shareholders which pool
shareholder voting rights and obtain or retain control of the
company. Shareholder agreements often require the pooled shares
to be deposited in escrow with a fiduciary, in order to secure the
enforcement of the shareholder agreement. A shareholder
agreement does not have to be made public or filed with a public
register. Because the shareholder's agreement need not be
publicized, it is not a defense for the company itself, as much as
it is a defense for a group of shareholders. 8 In addition the
shareholder of closely held Swiss companies often enter into
shareholder agreements in order to regulate questions of succession
and continuance of control and management.
55. Hoffmann-La Roche has a share capital of only SFr. 50'000.- divided into 16'000 bearer
shares of 3 1/8 Swiss Francs par value. However, the price of such bearer shares at the Zurich Stock
Exchange on July 21, 1988, was SFr. 180'500. See id. at 256-58 & 258 n.10.
56. Companies such as Sulzer, La Suisse, Baloise, Hasler, and Danzas. See Vogt & Wucstiner,
Share Transfer Restrictions Under Swiss Law and Hostile Takeovers of Swiss Companies, 16 INT'L
Bus. LAw. 356-58 & 358 n.9 (1988).
57. See Article 652, Swiss Code of Obligations.
58. It is presumed, e.g., that a shareholder agreement between the members of the founder
families of Hoffmann-La Roche exists and is still in force.
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G. Increasing the Share Capital and the Placement of Shares with
"Friendly" Parties
As an additional means of defense, a Swiss company also may
increase its share capital and subsequently float the shares to
friendly shareholders. This action is subject to shareholder
approval.59 Pursuant to several decisions of the Swiss Federal
(Supreme) Court,' this action does not violate the preemptive
rights of disapproving shareholders if the transaction is necessary
to pursue the objects and interests of the company. In May 1988,
the management of Rinsoz-Ormond SA, a Swiss tobacco
manufacturer and distributor, applied this defensive device to
prevent what it considered a take-over. The decision at the
shareholders' meeting to increase the share capital of Rinsoz-
Ormond SA was challenged by a minority of the shareholders and
forced the company to convene another shareholders' meeting in
July 1988. At the July meeting, the shareholders again approved
the increase of the share capital of Rinsoz-Ormond SA.61
H. Redemption of Shares
In general, Swiss law prohibits a Swiss company from
redeeming its shares. But even where certain statutory exceptions
apply, redeemed shares may not be voted on at the shareholders'
meeting.' Therefore, Swiss companies have either arranged for
one of its affiliates to repurchase the shares, or tried to find a
suitable third party (for example, a white knight) who agrees to
purchase the outstanding shares. This happened, for example, in the
cases of Sulzer, Hero, and Balolse, where third parties bought
shares either on their own account or with the intent to
subsequently sell them in the market or to a suitable friendly
59. However, the creation of authorized share capital is not possible under Swiss law.
60. See, e.g., the decision by the Swiss Federal (Supreme) Court in 91 BGE II 309.
61. Peters, supra note 4, at 547; Vogt & Wuestiner, Share Transfer Restrictions Under Swiss
Law and Hostile Takeovers of Swiss Companies, 16 INT'L Bus. LAw. 257-58 n.19 (1988).
62. Article 659, [1], Swiss Code of Obligations
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investor." Thus, although Swiss law prohibits greenmail, violating
Article 659 of the Swiss Code of Obligations is not likely to lead
to sanctions. The purchase agreement is not void and, under normal
circumstances, it is rather difficult to assess the damage incurred by
the company. The situation would probably be different if the
company bought its own shares at a premium. In the latter case, it
is likely that the responsible directors and/or officers would expose
themselves to liability suits.'
. Limitations on Shareholder Votes
Article 692, paragraph 2, of the Swiss Code of Obligations
permits a company to limit in its articles of association the votes
of any one shareholder. The articles of association may further
limit the number of shares any one person may represent.65 Many
Swiss companies have taken advantage of these restrictions, and
they have proven to be to be a very effective anti-take-over device.
For example, Article 4c, paragraph 2, of the articles of
association of Ciba-Geigy AG reads that
no shareholder may, in exercising his votes, represent
more than 5% of the share capital with respect to his
own shares or shares represented by him. Corporate
shareholders under common control are deemed one
shareholder under this rule. The board of directors
may grant exceptions to this rule under special
circumstances.'
In 1989, the articles of association of Nestle were amended to
the effect that, inter alia, no shareholder may represent more than
three percent of the entire share capital in a shareholders'
meeting.67
63. Peters, supra note 4, at 548-49 nn.137-47.
64. See H. FREIMULLER, N. VOOT, J. MARTY-LAVAUZELLE, HYBRID CORPORATE SECURMES:
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS 19 (R. McCormick & H. Creamer eds. 1987).
65. Article 689, [2], Swiss Code of Obligations.
66. N. VOGT & R. WATTER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 219 (. Lufkin & D.
Gallagher eds. 1990) [This is a free translation.].
67. Id. at 216.
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Companies may decide to include similar provisions in their
articles of association by a majority vote in the shareholders'
meeting. Generally, there must be justifiable reasons for the
measure, and the measure must affect the shareholders equally.
If the board of directors is empowered to grant an exception to
this rule, an issue arises regarding what circumstances are
necessary to enable the board to grant such an exception. In all
other cases, an acquirer will have to make his offer conditional
upon the shareholders voting for a modification of the articles of
association.
J. Golden Parachutes
Golden parachute arrangements are almost always void because
of the self-dealing aspect of the directors and officers who grant
themselves certain benefits to the detriment of the corporation.
K. Institutional Support
Defenses adopted by Swiss companies are also supported by
Swiss banks in exercising the votes of the shares they represent on
behalf of their clients. Swiss banks, pursuant to a recommendation
of the Swiss Bankers' Association, generally support proposals of
the board of directors submitted to shareholders' meeting. In
general, the banks have refrained from challenging decisions of the
management of a company. However, this complacent practice by
the banks is increasingly being questioned. Banks, as portfolio
managers, might be liable for failing to pursue the financial interest
(short-term capital gain) of their portfolio clients. This financial
interest is not necessarily identical with a (purported long-term)
interest of the board of directors of a company. In light of this
concern, banks have been adopting new rules and requesting
precise instructions from their clients in situations which might
give rise to disputes.
A foreign acquirer should be especially aware of the fact that
there are often close personal ties between Swiss companies. This
may be evidenced by the number of seats on the board of directors
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held by chief executive officers in many other companies. Banks
are particularly well represented on the boards of their corporate
clientele. Naturally, banks with these characteristics will not be
ready to assist in financing an unsolicited bid for such an offeree.
VI. TAKE-OVER DEVICES UNDER Swiss LAW
By planning a hostile take-over of a Swiss company, an investor
will, in general, consider the following take-over devices: share
purchases through fiduciaries; a tender offer; and the calling of an
extraordinary shareholders' meeting. This final section examines
these three take-over devices.
A. Share Purchase
A hostile take-over may be initiated by purchasing shares of the
target company through banks and other persons acting as
fiduciaries. Under Swiss law, there are no disclosure requirements.
Further, an investor is not required to make a tender offer to
shareholders once the investor has acquired a certain number (for
example, five percent) of the outstanding shares.
Theoretically, this allows an investor to remain completely
anonymous. The market, however, is not subject to bank secrecy,
and the purchase of a substantial number of shares will be noticed
on the stock exchanges. 8 This is particularly true where shares
are purchased solely through one bank. With respect to registered
shares, the board of directors must be informed by the bank of any
transfer of ownership of shares in their company. In the past, an
extraordinary increase of such purchases has been a clear indication
that a take-over was under way, especially if the company did not
subsequently receive the applications for registration by the new
shareholders.
68. For example, the purchase of ICN of around 7% of the shares outstanding of Hoffman La-
Rouche resulted in a price increase of around 50% and in the case of Sulzer the purchase of 30% of
the registered shares nearly doubled its price in the summer of 1987.
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As previously mentioned, purchasers of registered shares must
disclose their identity to the company if they want to be registered
as shareholders. The registration through a third party as a fiduciary
is, in general, not accepted by the company without first disclosing
the beneficiary. Further, such third party registration has previously
resulted in an immediate reversal of registration once the fiduciary
capacity of the registered shareholder was discovered. However, in
a recent decision by the Attorney General of the Canton (state) of
Zurich it was held that any such registration would not be a
criminal offense under Swiss Criminal Law.
Until the purchaser of registered shares is registered, the seller
remains registered and retains all voting rights. Pursuant to the
Swiss Federal (Supreme) Court," the non-registration of an
unwelcomed purchaser results in a division of the rights of the
shareholder: The membership rights (mainly the voting rights)
remains with the seller/registered shareholder (book shareholder),
whereas the financial rights (dividends, liquidation proceeds) pass
on to the (unregistered) purchaser. The seller of shares is not
obliged to support the registration of the purchaser. The seller may
even vote against the interests of the purchaser at shareholders'
meetings.
Unless supported by the board of directors, the mere purchase
of shares has not proved to be a successful device towards
obtaining control over a company. This is due mainly to the ratio
between registered shares and bearer shares of most Swiss
companies. In other words, even the holder of all bearer shares in
a Swiss company will almost always need support from registered
shares in order to obtain a voting majority. Nevertheless, the
purchase of registered shares through a fiduciary may provide some
leverage to an investor who is entering into negotiations with the
company.
70
69. See, e.g., Swiss Federal (Supreme) Court in 109 BGE H 44 and 109 BGE 11130.
70. See Article 693, Swiss Code of Obligations (e.g. with respect to the elections of the
auditors); Article 648, Swiss Code of Obligations (e.g. with respect to the issuance of super-voting
shares).
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B. Tender Offers
A tender offer does not require a prospectus or any other special
formalities or filings with stock exchanges or other authorities.
However, take-over bids, have until recently, rarely been made in
Switzerland.
The first hostile tender offer in Switzerland was made in 1988
by Denner (a food distributor) for a majority of shares in Rinsoz-
Ormond. The tender offer was published as an advertisement in a
Swiss newspaper.71 Although the price offered was double the
price for which the shares were traded at the Swiss stock
exchanges, and was substantially 'ibove the price for which the new
stock had been offered to a group of friendly investors, the board
of directors of Rinsoz-Ormond rejected the tender offer. Denner's
take-over bid failed.72
C. Calling of an Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting: Proxy Fights
A shareholder, or a group of shareholders, representing ten
percent or more of the share capital may request the board of
directors to call a shareholder's meeting. Such request must state
the agenda of the meeting. In a case involving a hostile take-over,
the meeting's agenda could include a proposal to replace members
of the board of directors, an increase in the number of directors, or
a change of the by-laws regarding transfer restrictions of registered
shares in the company. For a new investor, the best solution is to
convince a majority of the board of directors to accept the investor
as a new shareholder rather than to have transfer restrictions
abolished by amending the by-laws.
71. At the moment a second hostile tender-offer has been made for the shares of La Suisse (an
insurance company) by one of its (Swiss) shareholders.
72. The bid by Denner was launched at the time when Rinsoz-Ormond intended to increase its
share capital in order to place new shares with a group of friendly investors as a precaution against
take-over attempts. Denner's tender offer was made under the condition, that the share capital of
Rinsoz-Ormond was not to be increased and that the board of directors would approve the registration
of Denner as a new shareholder. However, the capital increase was approved by the shareholders'
meeting and the friendly group of investors was allowed to subscribe for the new shares.
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Proxy fights between shareholders are generally unknown in
Switzerland. This is mainly due to the fact that the shareholder
register is neither open to the public nor to shareholders. Therefore,
a shareholder has no right to obtain an address list of registered
shareholders in order to inform them about his intentions or to ask
them for a proxy. Thus, in order for a new investor to obtain
shareholder support, the investor must attempt to reach the
shareholders through other means. Alternative means of
communication include the press, or other media or indirectly
through the banks in charge of the portfolio management of the
shareholders. Although restricting access to the shareholder register
has posed great difficulties, shareholders have been able to
successfully oppose attempts by the board of directors to inhibit
shareholder rights. For example, at a shareholders' meeting of
Mikron Holding AG, held in September 1989, a group of
shareholders was able to prevent an increase of the share capital of
Mikron Holding AG (proposed by the board of directors). The
shareholders believed that the increase would be detrimental to
their rights as shareholders, since they were denied their
preemption rights with regard to newly issued shares in Mikron
Holding AG.73
VIII. CONCLUSION
Swiss companies are not protected by statute or other
governmental regulations against take-overs. Nonetheless, they have
succeeded in establishing, through their corporate organization and
through their capital structure, an efficient system of defense
against hostile take-overs. This is clearly demonstrated by the list
of unsuccessful hostile take-over attempts in the last few years.
However, a coordinated use of all possible techniques has never
been used in any of the recent take-over attempts.
73. N. VOGT & R. WATrER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 219 (J. Lufkin & D.
Gallagher eds. 1990).

